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Abstract 
Orthodox paradigms hold that through direct involvement with firms, the German 
universal banks funneled substantial amounts of financial capital into industry during the 
half century before World War I. At the same time, by avoiding such engagement with 
industrial companies, British banks are thought to have disadvantaged that country's 
economy with respect to its continental and American competitors. Using balance sheet 
data for the British deposit banks and the German universal banks, this paper shows 
that the German and British banks held approximately the same proportion of their 
assets in the form of non-government securities. In addition, the paper uses details 
garnered from two of the largest German banks to demonstrate that the universal banks 
became directly involved in only a few companies, that the total of these equity holdings 
amounted to a small share of bank assets, and that often the shares remained on the 
banks' books only because of an insufficient market for new issues. Thus, the idea that 
the German universal banks purposely took long-term stakes in industrial companies in 
order to credibly commit to behaving in the long-run interest of the firms finds limited 
support from this analysis. 
Bank Securities Holdings and 
Industrial Finance Before World War I: 
Britain and Germany Compared 
Caroline Fohlin 1 
Financial systems vary significantly between Britain and Continental Europe, with 
formal securities markets prevailing in the former and banks dominating in the latter. 
According to the traditional paradigm, strong, universal banks played a central role in the 
industrialization of Germany. British banks, in contrast, have been criticized for taking 
a limited part in corporate finance and are seen by many as having failed to promote 
industrial investment. 
Criticisms of the British banks, provoked largely by the perceived slothfulness of the 
British economy in the late Victorian and Edwardian periods, have become commonplace 
over the past century [Foxwell, 1917; Elbaum and Lazonick, 1986; Kennedy, 1987; and 
Pollard, 1982] . 2 As Michael Collins has suggested, complaints about the British financial 
system rest on two assumptions: first, that British economic growth was constrained by 
a lack of capital, and second, that banks could have, but refused to, provide capital to 
industry. 
Parallel assumptions underlie the common perception of success of the German sys­
tem. That is, the universal banks are seen as having actively and purposefully injected 
capital into industrial enterprises. The resulting expansion of capital available to indus­
try is thought to have propelled the rapid growth of the German economy between 1870 
and 1914. In his well-known critique of British financial institutions William Kennedy 
claimed that " ... capital markets in the U.S. and Germany, by making resources available 
to a large group of technologically progressive industries on a scale unequaled in Britain, 
account for much of the difference in the economic growth performance between those 
two countries and Britain in the half century after 1865" [Kennedy, 1987, p. 120] . 
One way in which the German style of finance is thought to have benefitted industry is 
through the banks' extensive holding of industrial shares. Taking equity positions in the 
firms they underwrote, supposedly enabled banks not only to provide financial capital, 
but also to stabilize the price of their client firms' shares. Furthermore, an equity stake 
in an industrial company conferred on the bank the right of representation on the firm's 
supervisory board-a position that, theoretically at least, yielded considerable influence 
over firms' investment planning. Perhaps most important among the purported benefits 
of the German system of finance, long-term equity stakes held by banks in industrial 
firms are argued to have provided the incentive for banks to act in the long-term interest 
1 I am grateful to Lance Davis for helpful comments and discussions. This research was funded by 
the NSF. 
2See Clay, 1929; and Carrington and Edwards, 1979, on the inter-war and post-World War II periods; 
Collins, 1991, presents a critique of the literature. 
of the firms it financed [Gerschenkron, 1962; Riesser, (1910, 1911); Wallich, 1905; and 
Chandler, 1990] . 3  Thus, direct industrial holdings by universal banks are thought to 
have promoted strong industrial investment in Germany. The British banks, in contrast, 
are thought to have abstained from equity participations in non-financial companies, and 
many have perceived this as evidence of failure on the part of the British financial system. 
This paper abstracts from the question of the growth performance of the British 
and German economies and examines, instead, the securities holdings of banks in the 
two countries concerned. 4 On the basis of balance sheet data of the British commercial 
banks and the German joint-stock universal banks, this work offers a much-needed, di­
rect comparison of the engagement of the two types of banks in the equity financing of 
industry. 
The findings indicate that preceding World War I, the banks' holdings of non-government 
securities were similar.5 In aggregate, banks' securities holdings amounted to a small 
share of GNP (or financial assets) in either country, but the ratio is higher for Britain 
than for Germany. Firm-level study of two of the largest German banks suggests further 
that the universal banks took positions in only a small number of companies; the total 
stakes of which amounted to a small portion of the banks' assets. Moreover, the in­
vestigation underscores the fact that, like British investment banks, the universal banks 
often held companies' shares for several years only because of difficulties encountered in 
floating new issues. 
The literature to date has offered only a few explicit, quantitative comparisons of 
British and German banks, yet this paper is not the first to question the strict delineation 
of the two systems. In fact, recent research has begun to undermine the orthodox views of 
British and German industrial finance. Wide-ranging evidence has shown that in general 
the universal banks exerted little control over industrial firms, mobilized limited capital 
through expansion of deposits, engaged relatively late in the practice of interlocking 
directorates, and failed to either promote rapid expansion or ease liquidity constraints of 
affiliated firms [Wellhoner, 1989; Fohlin (1996, 1997); and Edwards and Ogilvie, 1996] . 
At the same time, new work has demonstrated that the British banks provided medium­
and long-term finance through rolled over short-term credits (as is often attributed to 
the German banks) and offered guidance in business affairs [Collins, 1991] . Thus, while 
traditional paradigms remain popular, both outright condemnation of the British banks 
and unqualified celebration of the German banks are clearly unwarranted. 
Financial Institutions in Britain and Germany 
British and continental European financial institutions are thought to have developed 
3For a modern comparison of several countries, see Mayer, 1985. 
4Recent work has questioned the existence of a British decline. See Crafts, Leybourne, and Mills, 
1989. 
5Indeed, when government investments are included, German banks held a smaller share of securities 
than their British counterparts. 
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along significantly different lines over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. To illuminate the institutional structures in the two countries, Table 1 provides 
an overview of the British and German financial systems at various points between 1860 
and 1913. Total assets of financial institutions as a share of gross national product, given 
in the bottom row of the table, grew substantially in both Britain and Germany over the 
period but expanded more in the latter than in the former. Furthermore, while Britain's 
ratio exceeded Germany's in 1860 (57 percent versus 40 percent) , the British fell below 
the Germans by 1900 (93 percent versus 114 percent) . The gap grew to over 50 percent 
by World War I (103 percent versus 158 percent) .6 
Table 1 here. 
The differences in structure of the British and German financial sectors complicates 
direct comparison of the two cases. Virtually all of the functions relating to corporate 
finance fell under the purview of one institution in Germany: the universal bank. In 
Britain, however, distinct institutions serviced various, partially-overlapping segments of 
the corporate financing sector. The British financial system did not observe a strict di­
chotomy between long-term, investment banking and short-term commercial services, but 
only the German system explicitly combined the two types of business. Thus, comparing 
the German universal banks to the British deposit (commercial) banks underestimates 
the share of corporate financing institutions in the British economy. Nonetheless, at 50 
to 60 percent, British deposit banks and private banks accounted for twice the share of 
total financial institution assets in that country as the German universal banks (of both 
joint-stock and private forms) did in Germany. When the British discount houses and 
investment trusts are included, the gap widens. 
In light of the alleged importance of the universal banks in the promotion of industri­
alization and economic growth in Germany, the relatively small share of these institutions 
in both financial assets and GNP comes as a surprise. Furthermore, the sharp increase 
in the share of the universal banks in Germany between 1900 and 1913, especially com­
pared to the more gradual increases from 1860 to 1900, suggests that the universal banks' 
expansion followed, not preceded, the growth of industry. 
In contrast, the largest increase in the British deposit banks' share of assets came 
between 1860 and 1880, and the growth rate leveled off thereafter. This is closer to 
the expected pattern for the prevalence of financial institutions over the development of 
the economy: as the economy matures, the banks should play a diminishing role in the 
mobilization of capital. 
6The pattern reversed after the wars, and as of 1963, Britain led Germany again by a substantial 
margin. 
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Measuring Bank Assets 
The data for this study come from a variety of sources. For Britain, Sheppard's 
[1972] compilation of the well-known Economist series and Goodhart's [1972] archive­
based collection of individual bank balance sheet summaries provide the bulk of the 
statistics. Aggregate numbers for Germany come from the Deutsche Bundesbank's [1976] 
publication of money and banking statistics. For both countries, supplementary sources, 
such as stock market yearbooks and bank histories, offer additional insight. 
Though the main goal of this paper is to compare the investments of British and 
German banks, it is difficult to do so without reference to other types of assets held. 
Given the apparent differences between the British and German financial systems, it is 
even more important to address the comparability of the various assets held by the banks. 
The data for this study are taken from published balance sheets of the various banks, 
and accounting conventions differed somewhat between the two countries. While the 
various assets therefore have different names, they can, to some extent, be categorized 
by purpose, liquidity, maturity, and riskiness. 
For all of the available series, investments are aggregated under broad categories, so 
that no specific types of securities can be distinguished in general. The Sheppard se­
ries gives British government and government guaranteed investments separately from 
all others, but such disaggregation for the German figures begins only in 1912. The dis­
tinction between government and non-government securities is important mainly because 
of differences in liquidity and risk; with government issues considered safer than those 
of industrial corporations. While government securities ranked among the most secure 
options for banks' secondary reserves, some doubt, at least in the case of British Consols, 
began to arise toward the end of the 1890s: "It was formerly said that you could sleep 
on Consols and 'sell them on a Sunday.' A banker can certainly do the first now, but 
we are by no means so sure that he could do the second" [The Bankers' Magazine, 1900, 
quoted in Goodhart, 1972, p. 127] . 
Even when original balance sheets are available, apparently clear asset headings may 
be impossible to interpret unequivocally. For example, Riesser explained the difficulty of 
measuring exactly the banks' holdings of various types of securities: 
It would therefore be of but little value to give figures of securities held by 
the various banks, since the account 'securities owned' in many cases appears 
understated, inasmuch as a certain portion of the securities, properly belong­
ing under that head, is booked under the head of 'syndicate participations.' 
On the other hand, it is equally true that securities which properly belong 
under the head of 'syndicate participations' are at times found booked under 
the head of 'securities owned.' [Riesser, 1911, p. 404] . 
Because of the mixed nature of the German banks considered, the confusion among 
reasons for banks' securities holdings naturally arises more for the German banks than for 
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the British banks. In particular, the universal banks held securities both as investments 
on their own account and as a result of their underwriting and brokerage businesses, 
while British commercial banks held securities mainly as a form of secondary reserves. 
Nonetheless, the extent of securities holdings, regardless of reason, provides evidence of 
the relative engagement of the two types of banks in ongoing participation with industrial 
firms. 
While the level of investments may be important on its own, it is more illuminating 
to measure securities relative to other assets. For both the British commercial banks 
and the German universal banks, financial assets other than investments fall into three 
broad liquidity or maturity classes: cash and very short-term loans, bills of exchange, 
and loans and advances. In the British case, very short-term loans, termed 'money at 
call,' consisted primarily of loans to stock brokers for transactions in the London discount 
market or the London Stock Exchange 7 
Generally, universal banks included call money ( tiiglisches Geld) under the more gen­
eral heading of lombards and reports. While typically also maturing within days or 
weeks, German lombard loans provided credit both for securities transactions and for 
covering lags between merchandise delivery and payment. Therefore, because only the 
cash portion of this category is truly comparable between Britain and Germany, even 
very short-term loans may be better placed under loans and advances. On the other 
hand, despite some divergence of purpose, both German and British banks made short­
term loans on similar collateral (bills of exchange and other securities), and their liquidity 
and maturity were comparable.8 Since the goal here is to compare securities holdings, 
distinctions among these other assets categories are important for context rather than 
for the direct purposes of this paper. 
A final caveat deserving mention is that the British and German banks may have 
booked their assets in different ways. Goodhart indicates that the British commercial 
banks valued investments at or just below market value, but he also warns that "invest­
ments could be held on the books at any valuation, subject, of course, to the auditors' 
approval" [Goodhart, 1972, p. 21] . He offers an extensive discussion of the accounting 
procedures of the banks. Furthermore, it is clear that some banks failed to report any 
securities other than British, colonial, or other so-called gilt-edged investments. "Their 
holdings of these other securities were included with their advances or the miscellaneous 
item, to taste" [Ibid, p. 21] . Thus, the British banks' investments are probably somewhat 
undervalued relative to other financial assets, though it is also the case that fixed assets 
were written down as quickly as possible in order to bolster hidden reserves. 
It is also clear that the German universal banks undervalued their assets, but the 
extent in this case is also uncertain. According to Riesser, "considerable security holdings 
are not regarded as a favorable sign, although during critical periods large holdings of 
7See Goodhart, 1972, for descriptions of bank balance sheet items. 
8See Riesser, 1911, for details of the specific conditions on lombard loans made by one of the great 
banks, Berliner Handelsgesellschaft. 
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this class may represent an increased proportion of particularly liquid assets, or a special 
reserve for deposits" [Riesser, 1911, p. 402] . He goes on to explain that 
excessive holdings of securities will be interpreted to mean either that the 
times have not been propitious for the issue business of the bank, or that 
it maintains excessive speculative engagements, or that it is involved to an 
excessive extent in speculative transactions on its own account ... or, finally, 
that it has been unable to find sufficiently profitable employment for its funds. 
It is for these reasons that a large proportion of the writing off done by the 
banks occurs under the head of securities account" [Riesser, 1911, p. 402-3] . 
For the purposes of this paper, the important consideration is the relative extent 
of undervaluing in Britain and Germany, and that information, by its very nature, is 
difficult to ascertain. 
Comparisons of Bank Securities Holdings 
Figure 1 compares the aggregate securities holdings of the English and Welch de­
posit banks with those of the German great banks. Because of the uncertainties about 
valuation and reporting detailed above, it is important to avoid overemphasizing exact 
figures. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that the British banks' securities holdings 
fall between 13 and 20 percent of total assets between 1884 and 1913, while those of the 
German banks range from 9 to 15 percent over the same period. Moreover, the British 
ratios remained above the German ratios for the entire period. 
Figure 1 here. 
The bank categories used in figure 1 are given in order to bias the results as much as 
possible in favor of finding German holdings significantly above those of the British. The 
Scottish and Irish deposit banks held higher levels of investments than did their English 
and Welch counterparts, and the largest of the German universal banks held more of 
their assets in the form of securities than did the provincial banks. Therefore, the fact 
that Figure 1 still shows the British banks' securities holdings persistently above the 
Germans' provides a strong indication that, despite the difficulties in measurement, the 
British banks held at least as great a position in securities as the German banks. 
As previous authors have pointed out, the British banks held a substantial proportion 
of their investments in the form of British and colonial government and government­
guaranteed assets. These assets being unrelated to industrial finance, and being seen as 
more secure than other types of securities, i.t is important to compare asset distributions 
net of government securities. Thus, Figure 2 compares non-government securities for the 
two countries. Because the German figures aggregated government and non-government 
securities until 1912, the figures for the years before that are estimated on the basis of 
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the lowest holdings of government securities between 1912 and 1920 as well as on the 
detailed account of one of the great banks between 1896 and 1899. 9 
figure 2 here. 
When government securities are excluded, the ratios are much closer together, how­
ever, the German banks still show no consistent tendency toward higher securities hold­
ings than the British banks. Indeed, according to these estimates, the range was nearly 
identical in the two countries (7 to 12 percent for the German banks and 8 to 12 percent 
for the British) . Such a finding would fall in line with expectations, if one thought that 
the two types of banks were roughly similar. Since underwriting and brokerage were 
among the primary functions of the universal banks, however, it should be expected that 
the German banks held higher levels of securities than did the British commercial banks. 
Thus far, the numbers for the German banks have included securities holdings result­
ing from their underwriting and brokerage business. A significant portion of the universal 
banks' total investments arose out of their involvement in underwriting consortia (or syn­
dicates). These participations therefore include some shares that remained on the banks' 
books only because of the banks' inability to place the shares. Thus, figure 2 also plots 
out the securities held by the great banks that arose neither out of the syndicate business 
nor from holdings of government securities.10 This series gives an approximation of the 
proportion of assets the universal banks may have held as non-government securities had 
the universal banks focused primarily on commercial activities. 
Another way to determine what proportion of German bank securities holdings might 
have resulted from underwriting and brokerage would be to investigate the securities 
holdings of British institutions engaged in investment banking. Phillip Cottrell provides 
two such examples, and his data illuminate the extent of securities holdings of investment 
bankers in the mid- to late-nineteenth century. One example comes from the General 
Credit and Finance Company, which in 1866 held approximately 15 percent of its assets 
in the form of securities. The majority (approximately three quarters) of this amount 
was held as shares 11 Many of these shares were probably of railway companies, but it is 
impossible to tell from the given figures. 
9The proportion for great banks ranged from 17.6 to 28.6 percent of total securities held between 
1912 and 1920. Given that this period covers the first World War, it would be natural to expect that 
government securities might comprise a higher proportion of securities than they might have in the 
preceding years. In the one detailing of bank securities holdings that I could find for the period before 
1900 (Bank fiir Handel und Industrie, a great bank), government securities amounted to 24 to 55 percent 
of total securities (in the period 1896-1899). Thus, 17 percent seemed a conservative enough estimate of 
the proportion of all great bank securities held in the form of government securities. 
10Non-syndicate securities were estimated using a similar method as that described for non-government 
securities. For the years in which disaggregated securities holdings were reported (1912 to 1919), 
syndicate-related securities amounted to 51 to 61 percent of total securities held. As with govern­
ment securities, I used the lowest number during the period to estimate the proportion of securities due 
to syndicate participations. 
11Cottrell, 1985, p. 419, reproduces the firm's balance sheet as given in The Economist of November 
1866. 
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A second investment bank, the International Financial Society, apparently held even 
higher proportion of securities among its assets. In 1872, the bank kept nearly a quarter 
of its assets in the form of securities and listed another 50 percent in the form of 'lock­
ups' [Ibid, p. 538]. 'Lock-ups' included all assets not readily liquidated, and as such, 
consisted partially of loans. By 1877, the International Financial Society had increased 
its securities holdings to 56 percent of assets [Ibid, p. 599]. 
Naturally, these banks cannot be compared directly with the German universal banks, 
but the forgoing examples do support the notion that the great banks in particular, 
because of their active engagement in investment banking, should be expected to have 
held a significantly greater share of their assets in the form of securities than did the 
British deposit banks. 
To understand how important the banks' direct investment in industrial companies 
may have been for the growth of the economy, it is useful to combine the data on bank 
investments with that on bank assets relative to the economy as a whole. Table 1 gave 
bank assets as a percent of GNP for both Britain and Germany. Multiplying the aggregate 
share of non-government securities in bank securities by the fraction of bank assets in 
GNP produces the percentage of bank-held, non-government securities in GNP.12 
Table 2 reports the results of the calculation and indicates that the non-government 
securities holdings of the universal banks ranged between two and four percent of GNP for 
the three decades preceding World War I. Even if the estimates are only approximately 
correct, the banks' holdings of non-government securities accounted for a very small share 
of the economy. The German banks' share did increase between 1880 and 1913, but their 
holdings of non-government securities still only amounted to four percent of GNP by 
World War I. Furthermore, the biggest part of the increase came after the major push of 
industrialization in Germany. 
Table 2 here. 
The British banks' holdings of non-government securities, though also low relative 
to GNP, were significantly higher than the German numbers throughout the period. In 
contrast to the German case, the banks' securities share of GNP rose between 1880 
and 1900 and then leveled off. Given the measurement difficulties already discussed, 
however, it is best not to overemphasize the differences between the German and British 
numbers. Nonetheless, these calculations cast doubt on the idea that the banks' holdings 
12Since the aggregate data for both Britain and Germany begin in 1880 and 1883, respectively, the 
securities figures for 1860 can only be given as estimates. For Germany, estimates must be based on data 
for the one bank on which securities data exist (Disconto-Gesellschaft, discussed in the next section). For 
this bank, non-government securities amounted to 15. 74 percent of total assets in 1859 and 14.03 percent 
in 1860. Because the one bank used may have held unusually high levels of non-government securities, 
the percentage for Germany is probably significantly overstated. Using the higher percentage for the 
sake of conservatism yields an estimate of 2.4 percent. For Britain, using the largest non-government 
share percentage from the period 1880-1913 (13 percent) produces an estimate of 4.4 percent. 
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of securities provided a significant stimulus to either the German or the British economies 
during the last half of the nineteenth century. 
Evidence from Two Great Banks 
At least in the German context, details of specific securities held and records of 
any kind for the pre-1880 period are generally unavailable. Nonetheless, some details 
are available for two of the earliest German joint-stock universal banks. Walther Dabritz 
presented a sketch of the activities of the Discontogesellschaft (DG) in its early years, and 
a later Festschrift published the annual accounts of the bank through 1900. Evidence 
from a different source, Saling's Borsen-Jahrbuch, sheds light on the holdings of the 
Darmstadter Bank (Bank fiir Handel und Industrie). 
Figure 3 brings together the available data and traces the movements in the ratio of 
total securities to assets for these two banks. The solid lines represent the holdings of 
the Discontogesellschaft, while the squared points plot the data for Darmstadter Bank. 
The fine line comprises all securities held by the DG over the period 1856 to 1900 and 
indicates that such holdings ranged between 9 and 35 percent of assets over the period. 
The proportion of securities holdings started off at around 12 percent of assets but grew 
rapidly over the first decade of the bank's existence. The bank seems to have unloaded 
securities during the boom years of the early 1870s but then took on extremely high shares 
of securities during the middle of that decade. While the bank's holdings continued to 
fluctuate throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century, the proportion of securities 
followed a generally downward trend toward the end of the period. 
figure 3 here. 
From its founding in 1852 through 1855 (not pictured in figure 3), DG held no secu­
rities among its assets. Thereafter, the bank acquired substantial interest in securities, 
but a quantitative breakdown of securities 1856 to 1865 indicates that two mining com­
panies accounted for the major share of DG's industrial holdings. Shares in the two 
firms, Heinrichshiitte and Bleialf, amounted to around 11 percent of assets for most of 
the period in which the bank held the shares. Dabritz provides an account of the bank's 
involvement with these firms and indicates that such direct participation arose out of the 
bank's intention to convert the firms into joint-stock companies. 
Having bought up Heinrichshiitte in 1857, the bank invested heavily (equivalent to 
25 percent of the firm's capital) in the expansion of production capacity. The timing was 
inopportune; immediately the firm faced rapidly-falling prices of iron and questions about 
the profitability of ironworks in general. In the six years following the bank's investment 
in the ironworks, the enlarged firm averaged earnings of approximately two percent of 
the total capital invested by the bank (50,000 Thaler per year on an investment of 2.5 
million Thaler). During these years, according to Dabritz, "hardly a general meeting past 
in which the bank's management did not have to defend against sharp criticisms about 
g 
the purchase of Heinrichshiitte [Dabritz, 1931, p. 105] . The other two firms presented 
similar problems for DG, and the bank was forced to hold their shares until they could 
extricate themselves in the more favorable market of the late 1860s and early 1870s. 
The heavier line in figure 3 shows the proportion of DG's assets held in securities 
other than Bleialf and Heinrichshiitte. The vast majority of these assets were held in 
relatively conservative investments: government debt, railway shares and bonds, and 
other priority bonds and shares. With the exception of a few unimportant holdings of 
shares, the DG confined its participation in industry to three companies (the two already 
discussed plus another mining concern) [Dabritz, 1931]. Indeed, the bank's holdings of 
industry stocks amounted to between zero and three percent of its assets for the years 
in which disaggregated data are available (1852-1865) . Thus, it can hardly be argued 
that even the early activities of the great banks involved extensive, direct involvement in 
industrial companies. 
Though the disaggregated data for DG run out before the second wave of the German 
industrialization hit its peak, the story can be picked up in the 1880s using evidence 
from another of the great banks. Darmstadter Bank (BHI) published unusually detailed 
accounts of its securities holdings, and Saling's reproduced the information in its series 
on Berlin-listed companies. Table 3 gives securities by broadly-defined type for 1896-99 
as well as the individual industrial shares owned at several points throughout the 1880s 
and 90s-both taken from Saling's.13 
It is clear from the figures in Table 3 that holdings of industrial shares amounted to 
less than one percent of BHI's assets for most of the 1880's and 90's, and that, even at 
its peak, the proportion of industrial shares to assets only reached 1.3 percent (in 1882) . 
The top section of Table 3 gives the breakdown among various types of securities and 
shows that, including railway and real estate shares, the total of non-bank equity shares 
probably reached only four percent of assets. When bank shares are included, the total 
rises to no more than 6.5 percent. It should be underscored that the earlier numbers 
are estimated based on the ratio of industrial shares to total securities for the period in 
which both types of data are reported (1896 and 1897). The proportion of assets held 
in industrial, railway, or bank shares for those years peaked at 3.7 percent. Thus, only 
if BHI held a significantly greater part of its securities in the form of bank shares in the 
1880s than in the 1890s (doubtful, given that the concentration of banking accelerated in 
the 1890s) , would 6.5 percent be an underestimate. These data provide further support 
for the notion that the great banks ·invested a relatively small portion of their portfolios 
in the equity of industrial firms. 
Table 3 here. 
As for the securities holdings in Britain, Goodhart provides some details for three 
British commercial banks (Metropolitan Bank, London and Midland, and Union Bank) . 
13Unfortunately, Saling's only began publishing in 1876, and the volumes before 1882 are scarce. Also 
unfortunate for this analysis, they stopped publishing details of securities holdings in 1899. 
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Nearly all of the investments reported consisted of British, colonial, or foreign government 
securities or railway stocks and bonds. Given his warnings about the banks' desire to 
hide any investments in industrial firms, however, it is impossible to tell for sure what 
industrial shares the banks may have held. Edelstein, however, has provided estimates 
of securities holdings in the U.K. more generally, and those results indicate an expansion 
of industrial holdings between 1871 and 1913. Industrial concerns and railways, both 
foreign and domestic, accounted for 37 percent of all securities holdings in 1871 and 62 
percent by World War I. Home companies alone increased from 4 to 17 percent of U .K. 
holdings over the period [Edelstein, 1970, p. 235-7] . The banks might be expected to 
have participated to some extent in these investments, though proof of such a contention 
is apparently unavailable. Yet even if the British banks held no industrial shares, the 
evidence for DG and BHI suggest that the German universal banks were not far ahead 
on this count. 
Conclusions 
Because they are thought to permit direct control of firm behavior as well as indirect 
aligning of incentives in situations of imperfect information, equity stakes have been held 
out as an important feature of universal banking. Participation in industrial companies, 
particularly in Germany, is thought to have contributed significantly to the industrial­
ization and general economic growth of that economy in the mid- to late- nineteenth 
century. The common perception that British banks avoided such direct engagement in 
industrial enterprises has often led to the conclusion that the British banking system 
failed to reach its potential in promoting economic growth. 
While the German universal banking system has often provided an implicit yardstick 
against which to measure the performance of the British banks, only a handful of studies 
have directly compared the two institutions. Through direct comparison of securities 
holdings by British deposit banks and German universal banks during the half century 
before World War I, this paper has offered a new perspective on the involvement of banks 
in industrial firms. The results, while perhaps not vindicating the British banks, narrow 
the gap between the two systems in the realm of industrial participations. Aggregate 
data for the two countries indicate that the British deposit banks held a greater share 
of their portfolios in the form of securities than did the German universal banks, and 
that, even when government securities are excluded, the two types of banks maintained 
virtually indistinguishable proportions of securities among their assets. Furthermore, 
because the British deposit banks' assets amounted to a greater share of that country's 
GNP than the universal banks' assets did in Germany, holdings of non- government 
securities represented a greater share of GNP in Britain than in Germany. 
Finally, the examples of Disconto-Gesellschaft and Darmstadter Bank underscore the 
limited number of firms reached by the industrial participations of even the largest uni­
versal banks. The two companies that accounted for the vast majority of DG's holdings 
in the 1850s and 60s remained in the bank's portfolio for over a decade only because of 
the limited market for the initial public offerings of these firms. Even in the 1880's and 
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90's, once the new issues business picked up tremendous steam, the Darmstadter Bank 
confined its holdings of industrial shares to under ten firms. Thus, even if the British 
deposit banks held no industrial shares, the difference between the industrial holdings of 
the two types of banks is not great. Comparison with British investment banks, more­
over, reveals that, despite their active involvement in underwriting and brokerage, the 
German universal banks' portfolios of industrial shares were very small by investment 
bank standards. 
The findings of this paper casts some doubt on the traditional conception of the 
universal banks as providing particularly important sources of corporate finance and 
oversight through their holdings of industrial shares. This paper does not, however, 
claim to judge the overall effects of German universal banking. Instead, the analysis 
attempts to quantify the extent of formal differences between two institutions. Direct 
participation in industrial firms represents only one way in which the universal banks 
may have promoted industry in Germany. Perhaps the banks offered vital services that 
simply cannot be identified or quantified through their holdings of industrial securities. In 
that case, however, the characteristics of importance to industrial development arise, not 
out of the formal structure of the institutions concerned, but rather from the informal, 
though perhaps systematic, way banks operated in this particular context. 
The findings here provide one more piece of evidence that the orthodox view exag­
gerates the importance of the particular organization of the German universal banks for 
the industrialization of the German economy in the latter half of the nineteenth century. 
Thus, in drawing lessons for the modern problems of financing growth, qualitative vari­
ation in informal arrangements may emerge as a more important determinant of success 
than the formal structure of financial institutions. 
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Table 1: Assets of Financial Institutions 
Germany (billions of Marks) 1860 1880 1900 1913 
Central bank 0.95 1.57 2.57 4.03 
Large (nationwide) banks 0.39 1.35 6.96 8.39 
Regional (local) banks 13.65 
Private bankers 1.50 2.50 3.50 4.00 
Specialized commercial banks 0.98 
Savings banks, local 0.51 2.78 9.45 20.8 
Savings banks, central 1.76 
Credit unions, local 0.01 0.59 1.68 5.73 
Credit unions, central 0.47 
Private mortgage banks 0.04 1.85 7.50 13.55 
Public mortgage banks 0.68 1.76 4.05 1.20 
Life insurance companies 0.07 0.44 2.42 5.64 
Property insurance companies 0.35 0.83 2.05 
Social insurance organizations 0.87 2.44 
Total for all financial institutions 4.15 13.19 39.83 90.69 
Joint-stock credit banks/total 0.09 0.10 0.18 0.24 
Joint-stock & private banks/total 0.46 0.29 0.26 0.29 
Assets of financial institutions/GNP 0.40 0.73 1.14 1.58 
Joint-stock & private banks/GNP 0.18 0.21 0.30 0.45 
Great Britain (millions of Pounds) 
Bank of England 55 75 93 100 
Deposit banks 150 432 879 1,146 
Private banks 120 200 62 53 
Post office savings banks 35 134 187 
Trustee savings banks 42 47 57 71 
Building societies 10 54 60 65 
cws and sews banks 1 6 
Discount houses 35 37 67 
Investment companies and trusts 100 
Life and other private insurance companies 80 155 311 530 
Collecting societies 5 11 
Industrial and provident societies 11 34 78 
Friendly societies 33 54 
National insurance funds 21 
Total for deposit banks & private banks 270 632 941 1,199 
Total for all financial institutions 457 1,044 1,806 2,389 
Deposit banks/total 0.33 0.41 0.49 0.48 
Deposit & private banks/total 0.59 0.61 0.52 0.50 
Assets of financial institutions/GNP 0.57 0.95 0.93 1.03 
Deposit & private banks/GNP 0.34 0.58 0.49 0.52 
Source: Goldsmith, 1972. 
Notes: Assets of large and regional German banks are summed through 1900. Estimates are italicized. 
Table 2: Bank Holdings of Non-Government Securities/GNP 
Germany 
Britain 
Source: See text for sources and calculations. 
1880 1900 1913 
0.022 
0.044 
0.027 
0.063 
0.040 
0.058 
Table 3: Securities held by Darmstadter Bank (1882-1899) 
Securities by Type Value of shares (thousands of Marks) 
1882 1886 1890 1896 1897 1898 1899 
German and Prussian bonds 1,845 1,301 1,145 5,909 
Foreign government and railroad debt 1,422 891 4,797 3,230 
Railway, industry, and land shares 6,000 4,119 4,990 5,104 3,942 3,343 4,741 
Bank shares 2,571 1,950 1,919 1,694 
Miscellaneous 1,033 965 681 955 
Total securities 11,975 9,049 11,885 16,529 
Total assets 146,516 169,532 181,133 206,761 188,865 232,762 235,372 
Rail, ind., and land shares/securities 0.512 0.542 0.339 0.345 
Shares/ assets 0.041 0.024 0.028 0.025 0.021 0.014 0.020 
Shares plus miscell. securities/assets 0.030 0.026 0.017 0.024 
Government securities/total securities 0.154 0.144 0.096 0.357 
All securities/total assets 0.058 0.048 0.051 0.070 
Industrial Shares Owned 
Wiirttemb. Kattunmanufaktur 303 158 14 0 0 
Dessauer Wollengarn-Spinnerei 720 690 690 690 690 
Deutsche Gold- u. Silberscheide-Anstalt 420 0 0 0 0 
Frankfurter Hotel-AG 152 0 0 0 0 
Deutsche Wasserwerke 96 96 96 96 96 
Rheinische Wasserwerke 90 0 0 0 0 
Heilbronner Maschinenbau-Gesellschaft 86 86 0 0 0 
Wetterauer Zuckerfabrik 0 150 150 150 150 
Gross-Gerauer Zuckerfabrik 0 121 121 121 121 
Franken Compania Metalurgica de Mazarron 0 0 113 113 113 
Heilbronner Salzwerks 0 0 288 73 73 
Maschinen-anstalt Venulath & Ellenberger 0 0 0 100 100 
Miscellaneous 36 52 
Total industrial shares 1,903 1,353 1,472 1,343 1,343 
Industrial participations/total assets 0.013 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.007 
Source: Saling's Biirsen-Jahrbuch, various years. 
Note: Estimates are in italics. 
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